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	<title>Roger&#039;s Information Security Blog &#187; Policy</title>
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	<link>http://www.infosecblog.org</link>
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		<title>METRO Opens Doors, So Employees can take home all the equipment</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2011/11/metro-opens-doors-so-employees-can-take-home-all-the-equipment/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2011/11/metro-opens-doors-so-employees-can-take-home-all-the-equipment/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 Nov 2011 00:47:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Cyberlaw]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[General]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/?p=5647</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Recently, a Washington DC prosecutor declined to prosecute a former Washington METRO employee accused of theft.   He was found to have taken home nine laptop computers, a power generator, a DVD player, a BlackBerry wireless device, a color printer, a digital camera, lots of tools and a computer monitor.   The prosecutor wrote that the absence of enforcement of [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, a Washington DC prosecutor declined to prosecute a former Washington METRO employee accused of theft.   He was found to have taken home nine laptop computers, a power generator, a DVD player, a BlackBerry wireless device, a color printer, a digital camera, lots of tools and a computer monitor.   The prosecutor wrote that the absence of enforcement of policy &#8220;served to create an atmosphere where such behavior, although not explicitly condoned or excused, was part of an implicitly tolerated practice.&#8221;<br />
<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/2/metro-property-found-in-home-of-employee/">Source: The Washington Times</a></p>
<p> There is a lesson there for us in IT Security.   It is a bad idea to have policy that doesn&#8217;t match practice.  Additionally better asset management should be in place to prevent such activity.</p>
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		<title>Social Media Policy</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2011/06/social-media-policy/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2011/06/social-media-policy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jun 2011 22:50:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/?p=5468</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[﻿Do companies need Social Media Policies? I’ve wondered at times why the company I work for doesn’t have a policy specific to social media.   In the absence of such a policy, I chose to make sure my blog follows other corporate rules.   Additionally for any rants related to work, I either make them generic or make [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>﻿<span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Do companies need Social Media Policies?</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">I’ve wondered at times why the company I work for doesn’t have a policy specific to social media.   In the absence of such a policy, I chose to make sure my blog follows other corporate rules.   Additionally for any rants related to work, I either make them generic or make sure the opinion isn’t a surprise were management to read it.   </span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">While I’m not ultra-paranoid about security, I have tried (unsuccessfully) to keep my full name disassociated with this blog.   Some might worry that an attacker researching the company could discover what we use for antivirus, firewall, IDS, etc.   </span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">What is the goal of the social media policy?   The goal of some social media policies seems to be to keep people from using social media.   I just can’t agree with this.   If I were blogging with full name and company name, it would help grow my personal brand, and that benefits the company.   </span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Many of the policies that people say should be in a social media policy should already be in other policies.   </span></span></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">“You shouldn’t be speaking on behalf of the company.”   This is already in policy.   The only change for social media is to designate that you are not an official company contact, except where you are official then that needs to be noted as well.</span></span></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">“You shouldn’t be tweeting/blogging/facebooking about that confidential contract.”   Hey no kidding.   That should already be covered in policy and doesn’t really need to be in a redundant policy.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: small;">Michael Hyatt has some good points in his post about </span><a href="http://michaelhyatt.com/five-reasons-why-your-company-doesn%e2%80%99t-need-a-social-media-policy.html"><span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: small;">why your company doesn’t need a social media policy.</span></a><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">   Shouldn’t companies be encouraging the use of social media?    Check that out and the comments there for some deeper discussion.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Where I work, I’ve seen a couple drafts of a new social media policy.   I’m not happy.   It must be similar to the first draft Michael Hyatt received from his lawyers.    There are two things that I find particularly galling.   There is a prohibition on recommending any current or former employees on a social media site.   I’m not entirely sure what problem they are trying to solve.   For many today, social media is a primary vehicle for the job search.   If you don’t have a searchable brand, then you don’t exist.   This is like saying don’t buy resume card stock.  There isn&#8217;t a policy I am aware of forbidding me from recommending a co-worker.   I believe management is restricted to reporting time of service.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">The second potential policy change is more problematic for this blog.   Before blogging about any vender, I need management to get the approval of that vender.    So if Symantec releases an update and hoses my machines, I can’t warn people about that update without getting approval.    I don’t think they’ve thought this through.    Can I at least complain about the cafeteria provider Eurest without getting approval?</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Hopefully this gets fixed because otherwise to stay in compliance with this policy I will have to sell the blog to my friend Raul.   Ignore any similar posting style between Raul’s Infosec Blog and my own posts.   </span></span></p>
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		<title>Auditors and Company Policy, Part 2</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2010/08/auditors-and-company-policy-part-2/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2010/08/auditors-and-company-policy-part-2/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2010 23:30:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[General]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Audit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FISMA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NAC]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/?p=5010</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Back in 2007 I posted a blog entry about catching our auditors violating company policy by putting their company&#8217;s computer on our network.   Today, new group of FISMA auditors, same issue.   If the auditors were a bit slicker, I&#8221;d believe them when they said they were testing our controls for unauthorized computers.   (trust me, this [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Back in 2007 I posted a blog entry about catching our <a href="http://www.infosecblog.org/2007/09/auditors-and-company-policy/">auditors violating company policy </a>by putting their company&#8217;s computer on our network.   Today, new group of FISMA auditors, same issue.  </p>
<p>If the auditors were a bit slicker, I&#8221;d believe them when they said they were testing our controls for unauthorized computers.   (trust me, this guy was busted cold)  After Alanis, I hesitate to call something ironic, but it sure seems ironic that the people verifying our security policies routinely violate our security policies.</p>
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		<title>Jailbreaking &#8211; Unsafe at any speed</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2010/08/jailbreaking-unsafe-at-any-speed/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2010/08/jailbreaking-unsafe-at-any-speed/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Aug 2010 12:25:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Apple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[iPhone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jailbreak]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/?p=4941</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Look at me, making Ralph Nader references whether they work or not. Back in July, the US Copyright office ruled it is legal to jailbreak your iPhone in order to install non-appstore apps or even to unlock the phone to use with another carrier. What does this mean for iPhones used the enterprise? Just because [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Look at me, making Ralph Nader references whether they work or not.</p>
<p>Back in July, the US Copyright office ruled it is legal to jailbreak your iPhone in order to install non-appstore apps or even to unlock the phone to use with another carrier.</p>
<p>What does this mean for iPhones used the enterprise?</p>
<p>Just because something is permissible under the law, that does not mean that a corporation must allow it.    Apple may still make it a violation of their terms of service and void the warranty. </p>
<p>Jailbreaking  offers a greater potential for malware to be run on the phone.  Do you remember the iPhone jailbreak worm?   A popular jailbreaking technique was setting up SSH and leaving a default password.   Doh!</p>
<p>Dave Zatz had a recent post asking if there was even a <a href="http://www.zatznotfunny.com/2010-08/the-case-for-jailbreaking/" target="_self" class="broken_link" rel="nofollow">case for jailbreaking</a> anymore.</p>
<p>So while my company is full of engineers who like to tinker.   While the phone has corporate data, we need to enforce a no jailbreaking policy.</p>
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		<title>Out of Office</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2010/06/out-of-office/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2010/06/out-of-office/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Jun 2010 04:30:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Awareness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Backup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eMail]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spam]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/?p=1368</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Are out of office (OOF) messages a security risk or a useful tool?   (Microsoft uses the acronym OOF for Out of Facilitiy.   I&#8217;ll be using that rather than OoO for out of office). I&#8217;ve felt that the anti-OOF forces are the kind of ludite people who still agitate for a return to text only email. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Are out of office (OOF) messages a security risk or a useful tool?   (Microsoft uses the acronym OOF for Out of Facilitiy.   I&#8217;ll be using that rather than OoO for out of office).</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve felt that the anti-OOF forces are the kind of ludite people who still agitate for a return to text only email.  Rather than dismissing it out of hand, lets examine some of the objections to OOF</p>
<p><em>Out of office messages could inadvertently disclose information.</em>  &#8220;I&#8217;m out of the office, check with Joe at 555-12324.   Now the bad guy has another contact name.   In this era of LinkedIn, I&#8217;m not sure how big a disclosure this would be.  You decide for your environment.</p>
<p><em>OOF messages could verify your email address to spammers.</em><br />
 Your spam product and Mail server should be blocking directory harvest attacks at the gateway. I wonder if its still true that &#8220;verified&#8221; email address are more value to attackers. Either way, my spam filter prevents spam from reaching my inbox any way.</p>
<p><em>OOF messages could help an attacker engage in social engineering</em><br />
Now that the bad guy knows Joe is the backup, they know he may not know procedure as well. &#8220;Roger let me do that&#8221;. Personally I think that is a problem with training not OOF.</p>
<p><em>OOF messages could alert an attacker that its time to break into your home.</em><br />
While there are stories about burglaries when someone posted their vacation schedule on Twitter, that is often neighborhood kids and people you know. Not using an OOF doesn&#8217;t exactly help there. </p>
<p>Now that we&#8217;ve gone through some OOF FUD, how can you OOF safely?<br />
1.  If you&#8217;re running Exchange 2007 or later you have the ability to use a different message for internal senders and contacts versus external senders.  You can also perform OOF only for people in your contacts.</p>
<p>2.  Sign off of any mailing lists or set them to &#8220;no mail&#8221; where possible. You don&#8217;t need to be annoying the list with your out of office notes.   I think this is the real root of the anti-OOF forces, annoyance with mailing list OOF backscatter.</p>
<p>3.  The less said the better.</p>
<p>At work, you kind of need to let people know you wont be getting back to them for a while.   There may be a few businesses (e.g. financial) where the risk does outweigh the courtesy.   For most of us I think a OOF on the work email account isn&#8217;t the end of the world.</p>
<p>“Best Practices” are for people who cannot perform a risk analysis.   You’ll need to consider the risk environment and decide whether OOF is appropriate.</p>
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		<title>Corporate Fantasyland</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2008/06/corporate-fantasyland/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2008/06/corporate-fantasyland/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 01 Jun 2008 21:52:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AV-Comparatives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SANS]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/2008/06/corporate-fantasyland/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Twice today I read &#8220;enterprises do this&#8221; statements that made me laugh. Over at SANS the handler wrote &#8220;Corporates typically block outbound FTP&#8221; while describing Yahoo phishing that had FTP downloaded malware. Later I was reading the latest AV-Comparatives report. In the discussion of numerous Sophos false positives, the author says Sophos is used in [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Twice today I read &#8220;enterprises do this&#8221; statements that made me laugh.<br />
Over at SANS the handler wrote &#8220;<a href="http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?storyid=4498&amp;rss" class="broken_link" rel="nofollow">Corporates typically block outbound FTP&#8221;</a> while describing Yahoo phishing that had FTP downloaded malware.<br />
Later I was reading the latest AV-Comparatives report.   In the discussion of numerous Sophos false positives, the author says Sophos is used in corporate environments where &#8220;new software is rarely installed.&#8221;<br />
I&#8217;ve been looking for reliable statistics about what percentage of companies currently allow a significant percentage of employees to have local administrator rights.   When I see statements like the above I wonder if our policies which were once one of the more restrictive are now comparitively lax.  Or is it that the authors are merely stating what they wish were true.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Auditors and Company Policy</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2007/09/auditors-and-company-policy/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2007/09/auditors-and-company-policy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Sep 2007 17:07:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[General]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Certification]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/2007/09/auditors-and-company-policy/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It&#8217;s always nice when your own auditors follow company policy. We have an external auditor in for the next 6 week in order to obtain FISMA certification. At the kickoff meeting, we told the auditors that they were not allowed to put their computers on our internal network, but they were more than welcome to use [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s always nice when your own auditors follow company policy. We have an external auditor in for the next 6 week in order to obtain FISMA certification. At the kickoff meeting, we told the auditors that they were not allowed to put their computers on our internal network, but they were more than welcome to use our guest wireless. This information was also on the account request form that they signed.</p>
<p>I had a feeling that they weren&#8217;t going to follow our policy. We don&#8217;t currently have a technical mechanism in place to enforce such a policy. I opened our DHCP management console and sure enough 5 computers had a DHCP lease with a computername and domain giving away that their owner was this auditing firm.</p>
<p>So I was able to bust them on that, and prove to them that we do review the logs and record anomalies in servicedesk.</p>
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		<title>The Paris Hilton DoS</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/08/the-paris-hilton-dos/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/08/the-paris-hilton-dos/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Aug 2004 22:03:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eMail]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/08/the-paris-hilton-dos/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I think the lesson to be learned here is its a good idea to have a maximum message size and enforce it at all levels.  Even a very large limit like 100 MB would have prevented this message from being processed by exchange, scanned by trend micro, processed by sendmail before being stopped.  This could have been really  bad for the infrastructure.
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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was going through the outbound viruses last night. Most were false positives on ESPN or CNN web pages that were pasted into an email message (the scanner didn&#8217;t like the javascript). But one was called Exploit/BigEmail. That sounded kind of interesting. First I did a search to look for AV vendors with a virus named that. It sounded to me like the vendor was stopping large messages to avoid denial of service attacks.</p>
<p><span id="more-78"></span><br />
I checked through the logs and it turned out to be a 365 MB mail message with a file named Paris-DivX505-A.avi.  It didn&#8217;t take much detective work to conclude that a user was sending out the Paris Hilton sex tape via email! (the use of that term aught to get the hit count up a bit).<br />
I thought that was freakin hilarious.  I think the lesson to be learned here is its a good idea to have a maximum message size and enforce it at all levels.  Even a very large limit like 100 MB would have prevented this message from being processed by exchange, scanned by trend micro, processed by sendmail before being stopped.  This could have been really  bad for the infrastructure.</p>
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		<title>Developing an Employee Usage Policy Part 2</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/07/developing-an-employee-usage-policy-part-2/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/07/developing-an-employee-usage-policy-part-2/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jul 2004 22:45:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eMail]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/07/developing-an-employee-usage-policy-part-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[My professor posted the following guidelines for creating/evaluating an employee use policy. Email and Internet Usage Policy Implementation of sound, well-written policies helps manage risk by defining acceptable and unacceptable forms of behavior and educating employees as to the organizationâ€™s expectations concerning their behavior. Organizations can and should expect their employees to act ethically and [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My professor posted the following guidelines for creating/evaluating an employee use policy.<br />
Email and Internet Usage Policy<br />
Implementation of sound, well-written policies helps manage risk by defining acceptable and unacceptable forms of behavior and educating employees as to the organizationâ€™s expectations concerning their behavior. Organizations can and should expect their employees to act ethically and the organization, as well as its employees, should expect to be accountable to society for their actions. On the positive side, good policies<br />
encourage ethical behavior, and discourages criminal behavior,<br />
encourage polite and civil communication,<br />
encourage individual integrity and honesty,<br />
encourage respect for others and their property,<br />
protect the organization&#8217;s information infrastructure from danger, and<br />
the risk of lawsuits.<br />
Good policies also<br />
discourage copyright infringement, software piracy, and plagiarism,<br />
discourage slander, libel, defamation, and mendacity, and<br />
discourage profanity, obscenity, pornography, and waste.<br />
(See Kinnaman, D., Critiquing acceptable use policies. http://www.io.com/~kinnaman/aupessay.html)</p>
<p><span id="more-52"></span><br />
As always, there are four policy essentials:<br />
1.Policies need to be in writing â€&#8221; Unwritten policies may sometimes be found to exist by courts, and enforced, but to be sure that an organizationâ€™s policy is clear and fosters the behaviors the organization intends and limits those behaviors that an organization deems undesirable, policies should always be in writing<br />
2. Policies must be promulgated â€&#8221; A policy the employees donâ€™t know about is ineffective. Best practice is to have a signed statement that the employee has read and understands the policy.<br />
3. There must be some process to determine if the policy is being followed. If an organization has no way of knowing whether a policy is being followed, the policy may be (and usually is) ineffective.<br />
4. There have to be sanctions for violations of the policy discovered by the detection process. A policy with no teeth is ineffective.<br />
Good policies explicitly define and make clear to all users the ethical standards and expectations of the organization. The policy should explicitly state that all hardware, software, and related infrastructure made available to employees are property of the organization and are to be used for business-related purposes only. The policy should clearly state that email and Internet usage will be monitored and audited. No one should have an expectation of privacy regarding email or Internet usage.<br />
Policies concerning the use (and potential for abuse) of email and Internet access should probably touch on all of the following (listed in no particular order):<br />
conduct of personal business using the organizationâ€™s information infrastructure<br />
sexual harassment<br />
threats<br />
flames<br />
interference with others, including cyberstalking<br />
exceeding authorized access<br />
downloading software, music, or movies<br />
snooping<br />
on-line gambling<br />
illegal activities<br />
use of unescrowed cryptography and cryptographic keys<br />
playing video games<br />
chat rooms, instant messaging, and blogging<br />
chain letters and Ponzi schemes<br />
defamatory, illegal, discriminatory, offensive, threatening or harassing messages<br />
misrepresentation of oneself or the organization to customers, clients, vendors and other employees<br />
fraudulent behavior<br />
denigration of others based on their sex, race, sexuality, age, national origin, or religious or political beliefs<br />
political activities<br />
pornography<br />
child pornography<br />
use of antiviral software to protect customers, clients, vendors, and the organizationâ€™s information infrastructure<br />
privacy and disclosure of personal or privileged information<br />
protection of the organizationâ€™s trade secrets<br />
requirement for ethical behavior<br />
requirement of conform to all State and federal laws<br />
defeating or attempting to defeat the auditing, monitoring, access control or other security features or procedures used by the organizationâ€™s information infrastructure</p>
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		<title>U.S. vs Councilman opens door for admin snoops</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/06/us-vs-councilman-opens-door-fo/</link>
		<comments>http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/06/us-vs-councilman-opens-door-fo/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Jun 2004 23:07:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Roger</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eMail]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infosecblog.org/2004/06/u-s-vs-councilman-opens-door-for-admin-snoops/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Electronic Frontier Foundation charges that this weeks appeals court decision in U.S. vs Councilman gives your ISP the right to monitor your email. The court brief is http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/03-1383-01A.pdf The defendant used procmail and sendmail to monitor email from Amazon to the booksellers and other email clients that used his mailserver. He used a form [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2004_06.php#001658" class="broken_link" rel="nofollow">Electronic Frontier Foundation</a> charges that this weeks appeals court decision in U.S. vs Councilman gives your ISP the right to monitor your email.<br />
The court brief is http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/03-1383-01A.pdf<br />
The defendant used procmail and sendmail to monitor email from Amazon to the booksellers and other email clients that used his mailserver. He used a form of store and forward to do this. I believe the courts have held that wiretapping is grabbing the message off the line with a sniffer. It is a different charge when the mail is in storage. The courts dismissed the charges against the defendant stating that at the time the message was copied it wasn&#8217;t in transit.<br />
I agree that he is not guilty of wiretapping. I&#8217;ll have to go reread the Stored Communications Act to see if his claim of being a service provider is correct. I am currently in a cyberlaw class and we read the lower court ruling on US v Councilman a couple weeks ago. So I was pretty excited to see this case.</p>
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