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	<title>Comments on: The Case of the Backup Software DoS.</title>
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		<title>By: randaL</title>
		<link>http://www.infosecblog.org/2008/04/the-case-of-the-backup-software-dos/comment-page-1/#comment-252</link>
		<dc:creator>randaL</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 14:45:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&quot;The hardest part in reproducing this is the backup software not staying on a predictable port&quot;
This is obviously a _good_  thing as it makes it more difficult for black hats to exploit this vulnerability.  Since they would have to probe systems, it seems reasonable that network monitoring software could deny the IP before a corrupt packet could be sent.
r.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The hardest part in reproducing this is the backup software not staying on a predictable port&#8221;<br />
This is obviously a _good_  thing as it makes it more difficult for black hats to exploit this vulnerability.  Since they would have to probe systems, it seems reasonable that network monitoring software could deny the IP before a corrupt packet could be sent.<br />
r.</p>
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